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 Who adjusts and when?
On the political economy of reforms∗




Why do countries delay stabilizations of large and increasing budget deﬁcits and inﬂation? And what
explains the timing of reforms? We use the war of attrition model as a guidance for our empirical study
on a vast sample of countries. We ﬁnd that stabilizations are more likely to occur when time of crisis
occur, at the beginning of term of oﬃce of a new government, in countries with "strong" governments,
(i.e. presidential systems and uniﬁed governments with a large majority of the party in oﬃce), and when
the executive faces less constraints. The role of external inducements like IMF programs has at best a
weak eﬀect, but problem of reverse causality are possible.
∗Alesina delivered the 2005 Mundell Fleming lecture based upon this paper. For comments we are grateful to participants
at the IMF research conference and in particular to Paola Giuliano, Alessandro Prati, Ragu Rajan and Guido Tabellini. For
excellent research assistantship we thank Anthony Nibblett. Alesina is grateful to the NSF for a grant through the NBER.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Why do certain countries implement economic reforms relatively promptly and swiftly, while others delay
them, letting signiﬁcant economic costs accumulate? This issue puzzles economists and policy makers and
it is part of an even broader question, namely why certain societies follow for even long periods of time
policies that are clearly costly and unsustainable. In many ways this is the key issue at core of what political
economics is all about.1
The subject of the “political economy of reform” has received much attention.2 With the term “reform”
one generally means a major change in policy which goes beyond day to day policy management. One can
think of two types of reforms: stabilizations and structural changes. A stabilization is normally interpreted
as a major ﬁscal adjustment which reduces signiﬁcantly a large budget deﬁcit and/or stops a large inﬂa-
tion. Often but not always large inﬂations and large deﬁcits go together, especially in developing countries.
Structural reforms are liberalization of goods markets, changes in the regulatory environment, labor market
reforms, trade liberalizations.3
Some of the reasons why reforms are delayed apply to both types of reforms but in this paper we focus
upon stabilizations in both OECD and developing countries. We consider the model of “war of attrition”
applied to delayed reforms by Alesina and Drazen (1991)4 and derive from it a series of empirical implications
that encompass and nest many of the hypotheses testedi nt h ee m p i r i c a ll i t e r a t u r eo nt h i st o p i c .W es h o w
how the war of attrition model can be a useful tool to guide the empirical analysis on the political economy
of stabilizations. In fact the war of attrition model has two advantages: it allows the organization in a
coherent framework of many empirical hypotheses investigated in the literature and oﬀers some more; but
also it explains why sometimes the evidence may be murky. We do not present any novel theoretical result;
the contribution of the paper is empirical.
The key assumption of this model is that the political conﬂict over what type of stabilization to implement,
in particular on the distribution of costs of the adjustment, leads to delays. A stabilization occurs when
one of the competing groups can impose its desired policies on the other(s) which have exhausted their
ability to resist the undesired stabilization. The nature of political institutions inﬂuences the distribution
of political “power” between competing social groups, and this is the connection between the model and
testable implications on institutional variables we investigate in this paper.
First of all, the war of attrition model is consistent with the “crisis hypothesis”, namely with the idea that
it is easier to stabilize more decisively in times of crisis than in times of more “moderate” economic problems.
1See Drazen (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) for two excellent broad treatments of this ﬁeld.
2Several inﬂuential contributions are in the volume edited by Wilimanson (1994). Tommasi and Velasco (1996), Rodrik
(1996), and Drazen (2000) have also provided useful surveys of this literature.
3For a recent discussion of the political economy of structural reforms in the labour and product markets see Boeri (2004).
A “special” branch of the literature on reforms analyzes speciﬁcally the issue of post communist transformations, but by now,
ex communist countries are more and more similar to any other country, therefore a special treatment of them does not seem
necessary any longer; see for instance Shleifer and Treismann (2000).
4For extensions see Drazen and Grilli (1993), Casella and Eichengreen (1996), Laban and Sturzenegger (1994), and Hsieh
(2001).
2We ﬁnd support for this hypothesis, both for inﬂation and budget deﬁcits. In addition, and perhaps more
interestingly, we examine under which political conditions a crisis is more likely to lead to a stabilization. As
predicted by the war of attrition model we ﬁnd that stabilizations are more likely to happen when a crisis
occur with a “strong” government, that, presumably, can overrule political opposition to policy changes.
For instance, stabilizations are more successful and easier to come by in presidential systems, in those where
the executive faces fewer institutional veto points, in periods of uniﬁed government in which the same party
holds the executive and the legislature and when the majority of the ruling party (or parties) is large. We
also ﬁnd that a stabilization is more likely to occur immediately after an election, presumably when the
a new government enjoys a mandate and it is also far from new elections. External inducements, like the
presence of IMF conditionality programs, has at best a moderate eﬀect, even though problems of reverse
causality abounds here. Results on stabilizations of budget deﬁcits and inﬂation are relatively similar but we
also ﬁnd some small diﬀerences which we discuss. We should make clear that these results do not imply that
certain types of government are inherently superior to others: the ability to stabilize is only one the features
that a society may require in a government, but there are certainly others like fairness, responsiveness to
changes in society’s preferences, checks and balances etc. Spolaore (2004) and Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi
(2004) for instance have recently discussed this kind of trade-oﬀ in a context related to that of the present
paper.
The paper is organized as follow. In section 2 we describe the war of attrition model of delayed stabiliza-
tions and we derive several empirical implications from it. In section 3 we review existing evidence on these
empirical implications. In section 4 we present our data set and the methodology of our tests. In section 5
we test various implications of the war of attrition model on budget deﬁcits. In section 6 we consider similar
evidence on inﬂation. The last section concludes.
2 Delayed stabilizations: the war of attrition model
2.1 The structure of the model
The model considers an economy that after a negative permanent shock (not explained by the model itself)
is on an unstable ﬁscal path; imagine a permanent fall in tax revenues for given tax rates or a permanent
increase in spending. Consider, in particular, an economy running a budget deﬁcit ﬁnanced in parts with
foreign borrowing and by printing money, i.e. by the inﬂation tax which is especially distortionary.5
A stabilization is deﬁned as an increase in revenues (or a cut in spending, but for sake of exposition we
will talk of increasing revenues and hold spending constant) so that the debt stops growing and inﬂation
disappears; thus the budget is balanced with a non inﬂation tax, say an income tax, (which is assumed to be
less distortionary than inﬂation) and there is no more external borrowing. The government continues to pay
interests on the accumulated debt, no default is allowed. In this economy a social planner would stabilize
5For the generic war of attrition model see Bliss and Nalebuﬀ (1984). The adaptation to a monetary and ﬁscal stabilization
problem is by Alesina and Drazen (1991). Drazen (2000) oﬀers a simpliﬁed exposition of this model.
3immediately since delaying a stabilization is costly for two reasons: it accumulates the distortionary costs of
inﬂation, and increases the interest burden for the government since external debt is accumulating.6
Delays in the stabilization emerge from political conﬂict between two diﬀerent groups in this society
(there could be N groups, but let’s focus on the simpler case). These could be social groups and could be
represented by diﬀerent political parties. Each group acts as a single agent and there is no analysis of their
internal organization. The groups disagree on how to allocate the cost of the stabilization; each group would
like to charge to the other a large fraction of the additional taxes need to stabilize the budget. By assumption
one of the groups has to pay more than half of the costs of stabilization, say a share α with 1/2 <α≤ 1
and α is a given parameter.7 The question is which group will accept to pay a fraction α of the cost of the
stabilization. Each group has a veto power on the stabilization.
The two groups are uncertain about the other group’s evaluation of the costs; that is each group knows
how costly it is for it to wait but does not how costly it is for the other group to delay the stabilization.8 The
essence of the war of attrition is the following: the passage of time will reveal which of the two groups is the
weakest, i.e. it has the highest costs of waiting. In each instant each group chooses to wait if the marginal
cost of waiting is lower than the marginal beneﬁt of waiting. The marginal cost is given by the cost of not
having the stabilization for another instant, that is of living in an unstable economy for another instant. The
marginal beneﬁt is given by the probability that in the next instant the opponent group concedes multiplied
by the diﬀerence in lifetime utility of the winner group (which pays a fraction (1−α) < 1/2 of the stabilization
costs) and the utility of the looser (which pays a fraction α>1/2).9 The game ends when for one of the
groups the marginal beneﬁt becomes less than the marginal cost, and this will occur sooner for the group
with the higher cost of waiting. So in the end the weaker group (i.e. the one that suﬀers more from the
delays) will concede. But resolution is in general not immediate because the passage of time is needed to
reveal which of the group is the weakest. Delaying a stabilization is costly for society as a whole and it is
Pareto inferior to immediate stabilization, but it is individually rational for each of the two groups to wait,
because of the potential beneﬁts of being the winner rather than the looser.
2.2 Expected delays: comparative statics and testable implications
Stabilization is in general delayed.10 It is not only if α =1 /2; in fact if there is no gain in winning or
loosing, hence, there is no gain in waiting and both groups would “concede” immediately. Also, there would
be immediate stabilization with full knowledge of costs: the weakest group would know that in the end it
6As Drazen and Grilli (1993) point out one actually does not even need accumulation of debt as long as the inﬂation tax is
more disotrtionary than the income tax.
7See Hsieh (2000) for an extension of the model on this point.
8More precisely, a cost parameter is drawn from the same well behaved distribution; one group knows its own parameter
and knows that the other group parameter is drawn by the same distribution.
9It is straightforward to compute the lifetime utility of the two groups (winner and loser) because the model assumes that
no more crisis will occur and the economy will be in the stable equilibrium forever.
10More precisely the expected time of a stabilization is positive, that is a stabilization does not occur immediately. It would
occur immediately if one group had the maximum possible realization of the cost parameter. Also the analysis focuses on
symmetric equilibria.
4would be the loser; therefore, it may as well concede immediately and save itself the costs of delays.
Thus an unresolved political conﬂict in which the groups agree to share half and half and some uncertainty
about relative costs are necessary and suﬃcient conditions to generate delays. So what makes a stabilization
happen?
1) The passage of time. At some point for one of the two groups it becomes too costly to wait and
it concedes, i.e.: it accepts to pay the fraction α of the costs. In a symmetric equilibrium this moment
coincides with the one in which one group realizes that it has a higher cost of waiting than its opponent.
Note that nothing observable may have occurred in that instant, simply the passage of time has resolved
the uncertainty about the relative strength (i.e. the relative marginal cost of waiting) of the two groups.
The longer the period of instability of the economy, the more likely it is to observe a stabilization. However,
there could be a countervailing eﬀect: in certain cases, societies may develop institutions that reduce the
cost of the economic instability. Think for instance of indexation to reduce the costs of inﬂation.
2) Crises can generate reforms. A crisis, namely a turn for the worst of the economy, may anticipate
the reforms precisely because the relative costs of waiting and ﬁghting the war tilt in favor of concession.
This is more likely to be the case if the crisis makes one group particularly weak so that it brings it to a
quick concession since this group soon realizes to be the weakest of the two. Drazen and Grilli (1993) show
that for this reason a crisis can be welfare improving. In fact it reduces welfare directly by worsening the
economic situation, but it leads to an earlier stabilization, reducing the waste of the costs of waiting. If the
second eﬀect dominates on the ﬁrst one, a crisis can lead to an increase in aggregate beneﬁts.
3) The nature of political institutions. In addition to the economic costs of the pre-stabilization
economy, one may also think that there are political costs of delays. These are the costs of blocking the other
group’s attempt to impose a stabilization favorable to itself; where blocking can occur with lobbying or active
political participation (e.g. strikes). This interpretation of the costs makes especially clear the connection
with institutional characteristics of the country. In political systems where the executive has strong powers
and cannot be blocked by the opposition easily, the opposition that does not hold the executive faces high
costs of “ﬁghting the war of attrition”. On the contrary, costs are lower if the executive can easily be kept
in check. Imagine a situation where one group solidly holds control of policymaking, and it is very costly
or impossible for the opponent to eﬀectively exercise a veto power. Then, a stabilization would occur very
soon (if not immediately) because the group which holds power would impose it on the other. Therefore,
political systems that make it diﬃcult for the opposition to veto a policy should see earlier stabilizations. So,
for example, stabilizations should occur sooner in presidential systems with a powerful executive. However,
these same systems, precisely because of the uneven distribution of political power and lack of veto power
may generate very uneven distribution of costs of the stabilization. Spolaore (2004) analyzes the trade-oﬀ
between early stabilizations and uneven distributions of costs in a related context.
4) Political consolidations and elections. A stabilization may be more likely to occur after a political
consolidation in which one of the two groups becomes more powerful and makes it impossible (or too costly)
for the opponent to veto a stabilization program. A political consolidation may be the result of an election
in which either a weak pre-existing government gains strength, or it is replaced by another one with a
5strong majority or mandate. Thus, stabilizations may be more likely immediately after an election, precisely
because it may reveal which group is the strongest. As a result, in the election one group may give up the
ﬁght and concede. On the contrary, right before an election the uncertainty about who is stronger may not
be about to be resolved so both groups have an incentive to hold on.
5) External inducements. The nature of the war of attrition and, therefore, the timing of stabiliza-
tions may be aﬀected by external factors. For example, a binding agreement with an international lending
organization like the IMF may increase the costs of delaying the adjustment, making the resolution of the
war occur sooner. On the other hand, an agreement with the IMF that provides more resources to the
country and it is not binding in terms of committing the country to any particular set of polices may delay
the stabilization, because, in practice, it reduces the cost of delay by providing easier access to borrowing.
Similar considerations apply to foreign aid. Certain type of foreign aid, if disbursed in ways that makes
all ﬁghting groups better oﬀ, may delay stabilization by making life easier, a point made by Casella and
Eichengreen (1996). However, certain types of foreign aid may make one group stronger and resolve the war
of attrition sooner. In many ways this is the reverse argument of the crisis hypothesis discussed above.
Before turning to our empirical tests on some of these hypotheses, we brieﬂy review the existing empirical
literature that relates to these arguments.
3 The empirical evidence: review and new tests
3.1 Review of the existing literature
The only paper we are aware of that is explicitly testing the “war of attrition” model of stabilizations is
Hamman and Prati (2002) on inﬂation. However, many other authors have obtained results more or less
directly related to the empirical implications listed above.
1) The passage of time. An indirect eﬀect of this implication is that a stabilization may occur
after several failures even when nothing observable has changed, except, precisely the passage of time.
Interestingly this may complicate the test of other hypotheses based on the fact that certain occurrences
generate adjustments. Alesina and Drazen (1991) oﬀer a few examples of successful stabilizations that
occurred a few years after identical attempts had failed and no change seems to have occurred in the
meantime except, precisely the passage of time. 11 Hamman and Prati (2002) in their study of stabilizations
of high inﬂation (deﬁned as higher than 40 per cent per year) do not ﬁnd that the passage of time increases
the probability of a stabilization. They argue, correctly in our view, that this may be due to the existence of
institutions like indexation that may reduce the costs of inﬂation and therefore prolong the war of attrition.
2) Crisis can generate reforms. Tommasi and Velasco (1996) go as far as saying that this hypothesis
is part of the “conventional wisdom”.12 This is perhaps a bit premature given the diﬃculty of testing the
hypothesis that crises generate reforms for obvious reasons of reverse causality. Without a crisis, there would
be no need for stabilization. Hence, we could not observe the latter. The authors testing for this hypothesis
11See also Alesina (1988) for a discussion of several historical cases of debt reduction in line with the war of attrition model.
12See also Nelson (1990) and Williamson (1994).
6are of course aware of this problem and do their best at addressing it; in particular see Bruno and Easterly
(1996) and Drazen and Easterly (2001). The latter use the concept of “ranking reversal”. They consider
countries in the worst decile in terms of a certain variable, say inﬂation or budget deﬁcits, and they test
whether the “worst” countries move up in the ranking when they stabilize. They suggest that the crisis
hypothesis holds: the worst is your ranking before the stabilization, the higher is your ranking after it. They
ﬁnd evidence of crises inducing ranking reversal for inﬂation and the black market premium on exchange
rates, but they fail to ﬁnd evidence on budget deﬁcits and growth. Hamman and Prati (2002) also oﬀer strong
supporting evidence of the crisis hypothesis on inﬂation. They show that the higher is the rate of inﬂation
before the stabilization, the higher the chance that the stabilization will succeed. Perotti (1999) looks at
deﬁcit reduction policies in OECD countries and ﬁnds that more successful ﬁscal stabilizations are those
that occur in “bad times”, i.e. those when the public debt is high and growing fast. Alesina and Ardagna
(1998) also present some evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Incidentally, since the accumulation of
public debt requires time, this is also an indirect test that the passage of time increases the probability of
a successful ﬁscal stabilization. Finally, several speciﬁc episodes seem to support the crisis hypothesis, and
that explains its popularity. For instance the Italian ﬁscal adjustment of 1992 which was delayed for many
years of mounting deﬁcits, appears vastly motivated by the crisis of that year (exclusion of Italy from the
ﬁxed exchange rate area, and risk of default).
A related point concerns the fact that adjustments in bad times may actually bring about an immediate
beneﬁt on the economy; this is the case of “expansionary adjustments”. Evidence that in time of crisis
stabilizations can be expansionary even on impact can be found in Easterly (1996) on inﬂation and Perotti
(1999) on budget deﬁcits in OECD countries.13
3) The nature of political institutions. The issue of how diﬀerent political institutions aﬀect eco-
nomic outcomes has received much attention; Persson and Tabellini (2003) oﬀer the broadest and most
comprehensive empirical treatment of the subject even though they do not directly address the issue of
stabilizations per se. For our purposes, a few of their results are particularly relevant. One is that they
ﬁnd that presidential systems have lower deﬁcits and smaller size of governments. Also in OECD countries
parliamentary systems have larger deﬁcits than majoritarian systems, a result also found by Milesi Ferretti,
Perotti and Rostagno (2002) using diﬀerent deﬁnitions of proportionality. This is related to earlier ﬁndings
(Grilli Masciandaro and Tabellini (1990) and Roubini and Sachs (1989)) that in OECD countries coalition
governments have larger budget deﬁcits.
More directly related to stabilizations are the result by Hamman and Prati (2002). They ﬁnd that the
larger the number of institutional constraints on the executive the more delayed and less successful are
inﬂation stabilizations.14 Veiga (2000) shows that an index of government fragmentation is a good predictor
of the delay of inﬂation stabilizations. Also Alesina Perotti and Tavares (1998) show that in OECD countries
coalition governments are less likely to implement successful ﬁscal stabilizations.
13For a related literature on expansionary ﬁscal adjustments see Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), Alesina Perotti and Tavares
(1998), Giavazzi et.al. (2005).
14With speciﬁc reference to Latin America, Lora (1998) ﬁnds inconclusive evidence on this point.
7Note that this does not mean that certain types of governments are “better” than others. Government
that stabilize more easily may create other costs for the economy.15 Also governments that stabilize sooner
may be those which are also more able to impose a very uneven distribution of the costs of stabilization.
4) Political consolidations and elections. The idea that adjustments are implemented at the be-
ginning of an electoral cycle is consistent with two non mutually exclusive assumptions. One is the idea
of political consolidations in a war of attrition model, the other is the political business cycles hypothesis.
Especially relevant for our purposes here is the recent literature on political budget cycles which investi-
gates if budget deﬁcits increase before elections. This literature is rather large and we cannot review it
carefully here.16 Recent results by Akhmed and Zhuravskaya (2004), Brender and Drazen (2005a) and Shi
and Svensson (2006) suggest that political budget cycles are present in some democracies but not in others:
they are common in new democracies and in those with less freedom of the press. If deﬁcits tend to increase
in election years, obviously this implies that ﬁscal stabilizations do not occur at that time. But, as these
papers show, political budget cycles are less widespread than common perceptions of them. Interestingly,
Peltzman (1992) on US states, Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998) on OECD countries, and Bender and
Drazen (2005b) on a vast sample of both developing and developed ones ﬁnd that pre-electoral deﬁcits do
not help the incumbent to be reelected. Hamman and Prati (2002) show that inﬂation stabilizations are
more likely to occur immediately after a change of leadership, a result consistent with the implications of
the war of attrition model. Note, however, that an electoral result that increases the majority advantage of
an old leader may have the same eﬀect in the war of attrition model, because it could also be a political
consolidation.
5) External inducements. Many types of external (i.e. foreign to the country in crisis) factors can
inﬂuence the timing of stabilizations. One of these is foreign aid. As we discussed above foreign aid can make
the adoption of stabilization policies more or less likely depending on how it is disbursed. The empirical
literature on the eﬀect of foreign aid and its eﬀect in creating incentives for good policy is vast and very
politically charged. One of the reasons for the debate is the problem of reverse causality: foreign aid should
go to countries in trouble, so a correlation of bad policies and delayed stabilizations with foreign aid can
have diﬀerent causal interpretations. A recent pessimistic view about the eﬀects of foreign aid is in Easterly
(2006) who also provide a good assessment of the literature. It is fair to say that the evidence that foreign
aid has provided good incentive to adopt good policy is mixed at the very best.
A related question is whether or not IMF assisted programs (IMF conditionality) help. A relative upbeat
assessment is in Gosh et al. (2005) but this as well is a literature very charged with debates, somewhat
similar in nature to those related to foreign aid and with similar problem of direction of causality. Barro
and Lee (2002) provide a critical view on the role of the IMF as promoter of successful macroeconomic
policies. Easterly (2006) argue that IMF and World Bank adjustment loans have failed to provide the
correct incentives for countries to implement long lasting and successful polices.17 Informal observations
15For instance Persson and Tabellini (2003) suggest that presidential systems follow more procyclical ﬁscal policies.
16For a broad discussion of the literature on political business cycles see Alesina Roubini and Cohen (1997) and Drazen
(2000).
17IMF conditionality may work better if the country feels like it "owns" the program, i.e. it is not imposed on it. For a recent
8suggest that the inducement to being admitted in the European Monetary System created incentives for
certain countries (especially Italy and Greece) to reduce quickly their mounting budget deﬁcits.
3.2 New tests
What do we add to this rich literature? First we revisit many of the point addressed above in a large sample
of countries on both deﬁcits and inﬂation and on both OECD and developing countries in a uniﬁed and
coherent way. Second, we present new tests. In particular we investigate the interaction between the crisis
and other features of the polity and the economy. That is: a crisis can generate adjustments, but what
makes a crisis more likely to do so? How large has to be a crisis to generate a stabilization? What types of
governments react more quickly to a crisis? and when relative to the electoral cycle? Can external factors
aﬀect the timing? How do crisis interact with external inducements?
Thus the key parameter of interest for us will be the interaction term between an indicator of crisis and
some institutional variable or some other indicator that we use to test the implications of the war of attrition
model as sketched above.
4D a t a a n d m e t h o d o l o g y
4.1 Data
This section describes the data we employ in the empirical analysis. We use yearly data on a large sample
of developed and developing countries covering a maximum time span from 1960 to 2003. We use data on
total government deﬁcit as a share of GDP and inﬂation (computed from the consumer price index) from the
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) database.18 Data on macroeconomic
variables (the real per capita GDP and the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP) are from the Penn World
Table 6.1 database, while data on ﬁnancial development are from the World Bank database on Financial
Development and Structure19 and data on IMF programs have been provided to us directly by the IMF.
Finally, the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) of the World Bank, compiled by Beck, Clarke, Groﬀ,
Keefer, and Walsh (2001) and updated in 2004, contains all the political variables employed in the analysis,
except for our measure of institutional constraints on the executive which comes from the data set of political
institutions Polity IV. Table A1 in the appendix summarizes deﬁnitions and sources of the political variables
we use in the paper.20
On the basis of the (pooled) empirical density of the deﬁcit/GDP ratios and inﬂation levels we deﬁne a
variable CRISIS, a dummy taking value 1 if the country is currently in crisis (of ﬁscal or monetary nature,
discussion of the political economy of IMF conditionality and its relationship with domestic politics see Drazen (2002).
18Deﬁc i to v e rG D Pf o rc o u n t r yi at time t is computed by redeﬁning surpluses, variable series 80...ZF. The consumer price
index series are the variable series 64...ZF. We also checked our results employing the GDP deﬂator from series 99BIPZF to
compute the inﬂation rate for country i at time t.R e s u l t sa r er o b u s t .
19The database is available on line at http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/ﬁnstructure/database.htm.
20We also refer the reader to the original source book of the DPI database for more information on the variables. It can be
found at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/DPI2004_variable-deﬁnitions.pdf
9the relevant deﬁnition varying depending on the lhs of interest), 0 otherwise. A ﬁscal crisis for a country
corresponds to a deﬁcit/GDP ratio above the 75th percentile of the deﬁcit/GDP ratio empirical density
(equal to 4.75%), and, similarly, an inﬂation crisis corresponds to inﬂation levels above the empirical 75th
percentile (equal to 14.05%). To avoid that our results are driven by outliers, we have replaced the values
in the ﬁrst and in the ninety-nine percentiles of the empirical distributions of the deﬁcit/GDP ratio and of
inﬂation in the data with their closest value s .W eh a v ee x t e n s i v e l yc h e c k e d( a n dc o n ﬁr m )t h a tt h ee v i d e n c e
we show is not unduly sensitive to the particular values chosen to replace extremely high and low values in
the data, nor to the choice of the threshold we use to deﬁne a crisis.
With regard to form of government, we isolate presidential systems from alternative systems. In partic-
ular, we redeﬁne the discrete variable SYSTEM in the DPI database into a presidential system indicator
(PRES) taking value 1 if direct presidential, 0 if either the president is elected by the assembly or parliamen-
tary. This deﬁnition corresponds to a rough approximation of the structure of checks and balances within a
political system and pivots around the separation of powers among the executive body (the president) and
legislative body (the parliament). A measure of the structure of the electoral law is given by the variable
PROP, taking value 1 if the electoral rule for the Lower House is a form of proportional representation and
0 otherwise (that is, all forms of plurality voting). The eﬀective control of the legislative body by the ruling
executive is summarized by the indicator variable UNIFIED taking value 1 if the party of the executive
controls the absolute majority of the legislative; 0 otherwise. We capture the political orientation of the ex-
ecutive with the indicator LEFT equal to 1 if the executive belongs to a party of the left and 0 if right-wing
or centrist. The electoral dummies that indicate if in a given year legislative or presidential elections are held
are LEGELEC and EXELEC, respectively. We employ these variables in our analysis of political cycles
together with another discrete variable, YR CUR NT, counting the number of years left in the current term.
Finally, the variable EXECONST measures the institutional constraints on the executive. This indicator
ranges from 1 to 7 and is increasing in the number of executive constraints.
Table 1 presents some interesting summary statistics on the frequency of crises in diﬀerent political
systems. Column 1 shows that deﬁcit crises are distributed fairly uniformly amongst political systems,
t h er e l a t i v ef r e q u e n c yo fo c c u r r e n c eb e i n garound 0.3 for all of the categories. Thus deﬁcits crises do not
occur especially often in a particular system or another. In the case of inﬂation (column 2) there is a bit
more variation. Presidential systems have the highest frequency of inﬂation crises (0.37). This is mostly
driven by the experience of Latin America where many countries have presidential regimes and this has been
traditionally a high inﬂation region. We return on issues speciﬁc to Latin America below. Table 2 shows the
average deﬁcit (column 1) and the average inﬂation (column 3) during crises. Column 2 and 4 report the
average response the year after a country enters a crisis. Let’s consider budget deﬁcits ﬁrst. The response in
presidential systems is about twice as large as the one in parliamentary systems. Uniﬁed government react
twice as much as divided governments; majoritarian systems react more than parliamentary systems. In
executive election years the deﬁcit reduction is much smaller than in non executive election years. In the
case of inﬂation similar results holds with one interesting exception: in proportional electoral systems the
reaction is stronger than in majoritarian systems. Much of this impressionistic and preliminary evidence
10is consistent with the implication of the war of attrition model. We now turn to a more careful statistical
analysis of the data.
4.2 Empirical model: adjustments and political institutions
We now describe our empirical strategy. For country i at time t let us deﬁne the outcome of interest yit,
where y is either the deﬁcit/GDP ratio or inﬂation. Consider an horizon of interest for a stabilization of s
periods, s>0. In the empirical implementation we typically restrict our attention to four years s =1 ,...,4.
The change in yi over the period [t,t + s] is deﬁned as ∆syit = yi,t+s − yit.T h e v a r i a b l e ∆syit is the
regressand, determined by the following empirical model:











POL i,t+k + ui,t+s
CRISISit = I [ECDF (yit) >τ] (2)
τ =0 .75
uit = δt + λi + εit. (3)
In (1) we indicate the political variable of interest as POL i,t (averaged over [t,t + s]) and we deﬁne the
crisis indicator as CRISISit, setting it equal to 1 in the fourth quartile of the (pooled) empirical cumulative
function of y,as indicated in (2). The speciﬁcation is completed by a two-way error component (3), accounting
for country-level and year ﬁxed eﬀe c t s .W ee s t i m a t eo u rm o d e ld e ﬁned by equations (1)-(3) by OLS and we
correct the standard errors for heteroschedasticity.
Notice that in presence of highly persistent political covariates, such as form of government (PRES)o r




POLi,t+k over the adjustment horizon considered is practically
constant with respect to t. In the instance of POL it constant over time, β1 is not identiﬁed in (1). The
parameter β2 in (1) captures the crisis hypothesis, that is the size of the adjustment ∆syit should depend
negatively on the presence of the crisis. This implies β2 < 0. The parameter β3 on the interaction between
the crisis dummy and POL indicates an increase or a reduction of the marginal impact of the crisis on
the size of the adjustment (again, a negative coeﬃcient indicating a larger adjustment), depending on the
speciﬁc political feature considered. Diﬀerent predictions are associated to diﬀerent political institutions and
we analyze them in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.
4.3 Empirical model: extensions
Consistency in the estimation of the vector of parameters of interest (β2, β3) is achieved under the assumption
that the process generating the idiosyncratic error component εit is uncorrelated within and across countries
to the covariates set, ruling out bias due to omission of relevant variables.21 A straightforward check in
21This is an issue particularly pressing for the cross-sectional empirical literature on the eﬀects of political institutions. See
the discussion in Persson and Tabellini (2003) and in Acemoglu (2005). Clearly misspeciﬁcation of the interaction term is
11this direction is to include time-varying covariates, Xit, to the speciﬁcation. We include in X the natural
log of real per capita GDP, trade volume measured by the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, and the
value of credits by ﬁnancial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP. The latter variable is one
of the measures of depth of ﬁnancial markets used by Levine et al. (2000). All variables included in X are
measured at time t.
Moreover, we also control for time-invariant covariates by expanding (1) with an appropriate set of
interactions. In particular, we checked that our results are not driven by the Latin American countries and
we allow the coeﬃcients to vary across developed and developing countries.
A ﬁnal extension of (1) consists of relaxing the condition on the deﬁnition of crisis. First, we change the
value of τ in equation (2)). Second, we estimate:











as robustness check for all speciﬁcations in which we use (1). Results of extended versions of our benchmark
models on ﬁscal and inﬂation stabilizations are discussed in Sections 5.3 and Section 6, respectively.
5 Empirical results: Budget deﬁcits
In the Tables that follow we present results on budget deﬁc i t si nP a n e lAa n do ni n ﬂa t i o ni nP a n e lB .W e
focus ﬁrst on deﬁcits, thus on Panel A of these Tables; in many cases results on inﬂation are very similar
to those on budget deﬁcits. In section 6 we highlight instances in which the results are diﬀerent, comparing
Panel A and Panel B of these Tables.
5.1 Political systems
This section reports the estimates of speciﬁcation (1) for form of government (POL = PRES), executive
constraints (POL= EXECONST), uniﬁed government (POL= UNIFIED), and electoral rule (POL=
PROP), when the variable of interest yit is the deﬁcit/GDP ratio. The crisis hypothesis implies β2 < 0.
We also investigate whether stronger governments adjust more swiftly and aggressively when they are in a
crisis. We "proxy" strength of governments with presidential systems, where the absence of the assembly’s
conﬁdence motion insulates the president from legislative control, or whenever the executive relies on a
strong majority in the legislature. Stronger executives have more ﬂexibility of policy implementation, since
they face a lower number of veto players (for instance, low EXECONST), and have higher capacity of
shifting the costs of reform onto their opponents. Hence, we expect β3 < 0 when considering the interactions
involving PRESand CRISIS and UNIFIED and CRISIS. Symmetrically, we expect EXECONST and
CRISIS to have a positive interaction β3 > 0.
The results support these hypotheses. Panel A of Tables 3, 4, and 5 show the baseline regression (1) for
s =1in column (1). The coeﬃcient β2 is estimated at −0.015, −0.04,a n d−0.016 for PRES, EXECONST,
possible in this panel, but by focusing on the orthogonal components across time and countries, the likelihood of our results to
be solely driven by omitted variable bias is smaller than in the cross-section.
12and UNIFIED respectively (with corresponding t-statistics of −6.54, −8.78 and −6.85). The estimates
of β3 are −0.019 in Table 3 (with a t-statistic of −5.23), 0.004 in Table 4 (with a t-statistic of 5.01), and
−0.011 in Table 5 (with a t-statistic of −3.25). Given the dichotomous nature of the regressors CRISIS,
PRES,a n dUNIFIED, the estimated coeﬃcients relative to these variables and the interaction terms also
correspond to incremental eﬀects. For example, in Table 3, Panel A, β2 = −0.015 and β3 = −0.019 indicate
an average deﬁcit cut of 1.5 percentage points of GDP in times of crises that gets more than doubled (the
deﬁcit/GDP ratio decreases by an additional 1.9 percentage points of GDP) in presidential systems. For
s =2 ,3,4 the variable CRISIS tends to induce reductions in deﬁcits up to around 4 percentage points of
GDP. The estimates of β3 remain negative and signiﬁcant in Table 3 (POL= PRES), but do not increase
in absolute terms as s increases.
I nT a b l e4t h em e a s u r eo fe x e c u t i v ec o n s t r a i n t s( POL = EXECONST) has a positive and signiﬁcant
multiplicative eﬀect on the CRISIS dummy at every s.M o r e o v e r ,t h ec o e ﬃcient β1 is positive and signiﬁcant
at s =2 ,3,4.22 Thus, less constrained government adjust more substantially and this is consistent with our
results of Table 3.
In Table 5, we investigate the role of the political variable UNIFIED that measures if the party of the
executive controls the absolute majority of the legislative. The interaction term β3 loses rapidly signiﬁcance
and assumes the opposite (wrong) sign after 3 periods. This is countered by a progressive reduction in the
coeﬃcient β1, which becomes signiﬁcant and negative at s =2 ,3,4. This seems to suggest that, irrespective
of being in a crisis, ﬁscal adjustments are larger in countries with executives commanding absolute majorities.
Finally, Table 6 reports the results on PROP. Estimates of β2 are in line with those of Tables 3, 4,
and 5. Concerning β3, since majoritarian systems tend to oﬀer larger majority premia than proportional
representation, PROP systems should present lower attitude to stabilize. This would imply β3 > 0 when
considering the interactions involving PROP. However, the eﬀective seat composition of the assembly
and not the formal rule for assignment of the seats should matter in approximating the executive’s strength.
Therefore it is not surprising that we ﬁnd weaker results than using the indicator UNIFIED. The estimated
β3 is positive (and insigniﬁcant) for s =1 ,2, becoming negative and signiﬁcant at s =4 .
In summary, this section has provided strong evidence, both statistically and economically, that crises
lead to more swift and more drastic adjustments with "stronger" governments, namely when the executive
has fewer constraints, the government is uniﬁe da n di np r e s i d e n t i a ls y s t e m s .
5.2 Elections, timing, and partisan orientation
This section reports the estimates of speciﬁcation (1) for the number of years left in current term for the
executive (POL= YR CUR NT), the timing of legislative elections (POL= LEGELEC), and the political
orientation of the ruling government (POL= LEFT). Executive elections are not reported but discussed.
The war of attrition model implies that a stabilization should be more likely to occur after a political
consolidation, namely when one group gains political control. On the contrary, right before an election the
22In this instance it is sensible to discuss the role of β1, since EXECONST presents substantially higher within-country
variation than PRES.
13political uncertainty about the relative power of the competing groups may be at a maximum, or in any case
about to be resolved. Thus, it is worth waiting in the hope of winning the election! However, it is diﬃcult
to distinguish this implication of the war of attrition model from a more traditional one of opportunistic
ﬁscal behavior, namely the idea that governments do no reduce deﬁcits close to elections for fear of losing
them. As we discussed above, there is indeed some evidence that budget deﬁcits tend to increase right before
elections, but not in every country and all the time: political budget cycles (i.e. electorally induced deﬁcits)
are not the rule, and are not especially rewarding at the polls. Being as it may, Table 7 presents results
conﬁrming the hypothesis that stabilizations are more likely to occur at the beginning of a term of oﬃce, i.e.
away from future elections. In columns 1-3, we verify that the number of years left in current term tends to
i n c r e a s et h es i z eo ft h ea d j u s t m e n t( h e n c et h en e g a t i v ee ﬀe c t )m e a s u r e da sc h a n g ei nd e ﬁcit/GDP one year
after the crisis (i.e. s =1 ). The estimated coeﬃcient β1 is −0.002 in columns (1) and (2) and −0.001 in
column (3) with a t-statistic of −3.22, −3.16,a n d−1.99 respectively.
Estimates of β2 are in line with those of Tables 3-6, indicating a statistical signiﬁcant reduction of the
LHS variable of at least 1.6 percent. The sign of β3 shows that the response to crisis immediately after
elections is ampliﬁed, but the coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant and it is small. In columns 4-6, we
consider the eﬀect of legislative elections in a speciﬁcation of form (1) with s =1 . Fiscal adjustments are
smaller in years of legislative elections but not signiﬁcantly so. Only when the interaction term is excluded
the coeﬃcient β1 is signiﬁcant at the 10 percent conﬁdence level. Similar (but equally insigniﬁcant) results
holds for executive elections.
We conclude this section by focusing on the partisan orientation of the executive. In Panel A of Table 8
we ﬁnd that for s =2 ,3,4 governments on the left cut budget deﬁcits more, but they do not do so in times
of crisis. This evidence, which however as we discuss below is not extremely robust to speciﬁcation checks,
is consistent with the one in Ardagna (2004) who shows that in developed countries left-wing governments
are more likely to implement ﬁscal stabilizations associated with a persistent reduction of the debt-to-
GDP ratio. One possible explanation for this evidence is that left-wing governments face less resistance to
reform than right-wing ones: for example, unions or pensioners, groups that in many countries inﬂuence the
implementation of governments’ economic policies, can be more willing to oﬀer their support to left-wing
governments and allow them to cut government spending and/or increase tax rates.
5.3 Extensions and Sensitivity
We now report robustness checks of several types for the benchmark model deﬁned by equations (1) - (3).
Speciﬁcally: i) we add time-varying controls to the rhs of equation (1); ii) we add time-invarying interactions;
iii) we experiment with diﬀerent values of τ in equation (2); iv) we estimate equation (4), where the discrete
dummy variable CRISIS is replaced by the level of deﬁcit over GDP, a continuous regressor, v) we allow
for non-linearities in equation (4), and vi) we investigate whether the reduction of the deﬁcit/GDP ratio
is increasing in its initial level in a non-linear way. We consider each type of robustness checks separately
for both our analysis of political systems and that of electoral timing. Results are not shown but they are
14available upon request.
With respect to points i), ii) and iii) all results presented in Tables 3-8 are robust to the respective
changes in speciﬁcation. More speciﬁcally, to control for omitted variables, we begin by including among the
regressors the natural log of real per capita GDP, the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, and the value
of credits by ﬁnancial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP, all dated at time t.T h eﬁrst two
additional regressors are the controls used by Persson and Tabellini (2003); the value of credits by ﬁnancial
intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP is one of the indicators of ﬁnancial development used
by Levine et al. (2000). Our results are virtually unchanged.
Second, we let the coeﬃcients β1, β2,a n dβ3 diﬀer for Latin American countries and other countries
in the sample and for developed and developing countries. In general, we do not ﬁnd evidence that one
particular group of countries drives the results presented so far.
Third, we reestimate regressions in Tables 3-8 using two alternative deﬁnitions of CRISIS to check
that our results do not hinge on the particular threshold used to identify periods of large budget deﬁcit.
Speciﬁcally, we consider the cases in which a ﬁscal crisis for a country corresponds to a deﬁcit/GDP ratio
above the 60th or 90th percentile of the deﬁcit/GDP ratio empirical density (equal respectively to 3.11%
and 7.95%). Interestingly and consistently with the crisis hypothesis, we ﬁnd that the size and signiﬁcance
of the coeﬃcients β2,a n dβ3 are increasing in the value of the deﬁcit/GDP ratio above which a country is
experiencing a ﬁscal crisis.
Fourth, we estimate equation (4), where the dichotomous CRISIS dummy is replaced by the initial
level of deﬁcit/GDP. With respect to PRES and EXECONST we ﬁnd that signs and signiﬁcance of the
parameter vector (β2, β3) concord to those in Tables 3 and 4. Relative to Table 5 and the role of a uniﬁed
government (UNIFIED =1 ), the corresponding continuous models report more statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀects of the expected sign. The same is also true when comparing proportional representation systems in
the continuous model. Here positive estimates of β3 (for the interaction between the initial deﬁcit ratio and
PROP)a r es i g n i ﬁcant at least at the 10% level for s =1 ,2,b u tb e c o m ei n s i g n i ﬁcant for s =3 ,4 and change
sign for s =4 . The results on distance from elections are robust. Regarding the political ideology of the
executive, instead, we ﬁnd that the results in Table 8 for LEFT are not particularly robust. Only for s =4
we report a signiﬁcant, negative, but quantitatively small eﬀect of LEFT (β1 = −0.008).
Fifth, we also allow for non-linear eﬀects in the continuos speciﬁcation in (4) by estimating spline regres-
sions that allow the coeﬃcients β2 and β3 to diﬀer for values of the deﬁcit/GDP ratio below/above the 75th
percentile of the deﬁcit/GDP ratio empirical density (equal respectively to 4.75%). We ﬁnd some evidence
of a statistically signiﬁcant incremental eﬀect from the interaction of the deﬁcit and political variables when
the deﬁcit/GDP ratio is greater than 4.75%,c o n ﬁrming our previous results that diﬀerences in the form of
governments become particularly important when the country is in times of crisis.
Finally, we investigate whether the reduction of the deﬁcit/GDP ratio increases non-linearly in its initial
level by estimating spline regressions of the change of the deﬁcit/GDP ratio on its lagged value and allowing
the coeﬃcient to diﬀer for values of the deﬁcit/GDP ratio above the 50th, 75th, 90th, 95th percentile of
the deﬁcit/GDP ratio empirical density (equal respectively to 2.27%, 4.75%, 7.9%, 10.6%). As expected,
15the coeﬃcient of the lagged deﬁcit/GDP ratio is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at any time horizon,
implying that the decrease in the budget deﬁcit is increasing in the initial value of the deﬁcit/GDP ratio.
Moreover, we ﬁnd evidence of a statistical signiﬁcant incremental eﬀect for values of the initial level of the
deﬁcit/GDP larger than 10.6%. Note that results in Drazen and Easterly (2001) support the “crisis-induces-
reforms hypothesis” for the inﬂation rate and the black market premium, but not for the budget deﬁcit. Our
estimates, instead, suggest that governments are able to sharply cut the budget deﬁcit when the latter has
reached extreme high values.
5.4 IMF conditionality
We now investigate if agreements with the IMF play any role in budget deﬁcit stabilizations. We reestimate
the benchmark model in (1) - (3) but the variable POL now captures countries’ participation to IMF
programs. We measures countries’ participation with three diﬀerent variables: i) a dummy variable equal to
1 in every year in which a country is under an IMF agreement for at least 6 months and 0 otherwise; ii) a
dummy variable equal to 1 in the year in which the country signs a new loan agreement with the IMF and
0 otherwise; iii) a variable measuring for each year the number of months the country is in an agreement
with the IMF. We follow Barro and Lee (2002) and focus only on short and medium-term IMF programs,
i.e.: the Stand-by-Arrangements (SBA) and the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) programs.
In Panel A of Table 9 we report the results using the ﬁrst of the three variables just described. We do not
ﬁnd consistent evidence that participation to an IMF program induces reductions of budget deﬁcits. The
coeﬃcients β1 and β3 are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level only for s =4 . The signs of the coeﬃcients
imply that participation to an IMF program is associated with increases in budget deﬁcit ( β1 > 0), but, in
periods of crisis, governments reduce the deﬁcit and the decrease is larger in countries that are under an IMF
agreement (β2 < 0, β3 < 0). This evidence is, however, only suggestive. Given the possible endogeneity of
the variables used to measure participation to IMF programs, we would have to follow an approach similar
to the one in Barro and Lee (2002) to properly estimate the eﬀect of IMF programs. While this is beyond the
scope of this project (mainly because of lack of yearly data for valid instruments), nevertheless we run some
IV regressions. We instrument the IMF program dummy and its interaction with the variable CRISIS with
ﬁrst or second lags of these same variables. When we do so, the qualitative nature of the results does not
change, but the size and signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients do. Speciﬁcally, both β1 and β3 increase in absolute
v a l u ea n dt h ec o e ﬃcients are now statistically signiﬁcant at s =3and in one case also at s =2 . Finally,
when we measure countries’ participation with the other two variables, results (not shown but available upon
r e q u e s t )a r ea l o n gt h es a m el i n e .T h ee v i d e n c eo nt h ee ﬀect of IMF programs on budget deﬁcit stabilizations
is not clear-cut and, if anything, our estimates indicate an eﬀect only a few years after the country has
experienced a budget deﬁcit crisis (i.e.: for s =3 ,4). These results are consistent with the analysis of Gosh
et al. (2005) which shows that IMF targets for deﬁcit reductions of countries under IMF agreements are often
and substantially missed. In particular many countries seem to be unable to control spending as required
by IMF target agreements.
166 Empirical results: Inﬂation
This section focuses on adjustments of inﬂation rates. We follow a structure analogous to Section 5 and
estimates of the benchmark model deﬁned by equations (1) - (3) are in Panel B of Tables 3-9. In what
follows, we mostly highlight the diﬀerences from the results on budget deﬁcit.
Political systems seem to play an important role for inﬂation stabilizations. In Panel B of Table 3
for s =1the estimated β2 = −0.037 and β3 = −0.079 are signiﬁcant at 1 percent conﬁdence level. The
additional reduction due to the form of government more than doubles the crisis coeﬃcient, indicating a very
substantial reduction in inﬂation rates for presidential countries facing an inﬂationary crisis. The estimates
for s =2 ,3,4 are quantitatively higher and remain statistically signiﬁcant.
T h es a m er e s u l t sa r ec o n ﬁrmed for the measure of executive constraints EXECONST, in Table 4, where
the estimates are again quantitatively substantial, β2 =0 .0018 and β3 =0 .0052. Table 5 reports the results
for UNIFIED.H a v i n gau n i ﬁed government produces an extra reduction of the inﬂation rate between 3.8
and 6.4 percentage points in times of crisis. These results are robust to controlling for initial value of (log)
real per capita GDP, trade volume, the measure of depth of ﬁnancial markets, interaction for Latin America
and to the additional speciﬁcation eﬀect we described in section 5.3. The results of Table 6 investigating the
role of POL= PROP for inﬂation adjustments are more puzzling. We ﬁnd evidence that in times of crisis
proportional systems reduce inﬂation more at all s =1 ,2,3,4. This seems contrary to the intuition behind
the war of attrition model and to previous results concerning the control of the parliament (UNIFIED =1 ).
However, when controlling for our set of additional regressors (i.e. the natural log of real per capita GDP,
the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, and the value of credits by ﬁnancial intermediaries to the private
sector divided by GDP), signiﬁcance at s =1 ,2 is lost.
In Table 7’s Panel B we ﬁnd no evidence of election timing. There is no direct eﬀect or interaction eﬀect
with CRISIS of the number of years left in current term or the legislative election year dummy. Indeed,
t h es i g n so ft h ec o e ﬃcients are the opposite of those for the budget deﬁcit and generally not signiﬁcant.
Particularly, the coeﬃcient β1 =0 .003 in column (3) is only borderline signiﬁcant and has the “wrong” sign
in Table 7 and becomes signiﬁcant in speciﬁcation (4). Regarding the political ideology of the executive, Table
8 and results from the speciﬁcation (4) indicate no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in LEFT.I n ﬂation
stabilizations do not seem related in any way to the ideological aﬃliation of the executive.
Panel B of Table 9 presents results concerning inﬂationary crises and IMF program participation. The
main diﬀerence between ﬁscal and inﬂationary crisis is that IMF programs appear to be more eﬀective in
curbing inﬂation in times of crisis. At s =2 ,3,4 the impact of the interaction term between CRISIS and
IMFPROGR is negative, statistically signiﬁcant and quantitatively sizeable, ranging from −13 percent at
s =2to −21.1 percent at s =3 .
177C o n c l u s i o n s
The war of attrition model does reasonably well as a guidance for empirical test of the timing of stabilization.
In this paper we have presented evidence broadly consistent with this model on both inﬂation and budget
deﬁcits for a large sample of countries. Rather than the reviewing one more time our results, we conclude
by discussing potential extensions.
In this paper we did not address the question of what causes a crisis. In ongoing research we are looking at
the joint determination of a crisis and the subsequent stabilization by making the event of a crisis endogenous
to politico-economic factors. Second, an important aspect of the war of attrition model is that the costs of the
stabilization are distributed unevenly; we did not consider this issue, namely the distributional consequences
of stabilizations. For example certain types of governments may implement stabilizations more quickly than
others but may chose more unfair distribution of costs. Third, we need to push forward the discussion of
external inducements to stabilizations, a topic that we addressed only imperfectly in this paper. As argued
above this is an issue in which problems of reverse causality abound, and one needs to think carefully how to
resolve this. Also we looked only at IMF conditionality, one could consider also foreign aid in the same spirit
and test more precisely the implications of the war of attrition model regarding when foreign aid can be
(counter)productive for stabilizations. Fourth, one could analyze diﬀerent types of policy reforms, those that
we labeled structural, like labor market reforms, trade liberalizations, deregulation etc. The war of attrition
model may be useful for these reforms as well, even though in these cases unlike inﬂation or budget deﬁcits,
the sense of urgency and crisis may be smaller. While an hyperinﬂation or an exploding budget deﬁcit cannot
last for too long, trade restrictions can be in place for a long time, creating costly distortions but not a deep
crisis. Finally, we have considered institutions as predetermined in this paper, but institutions (i.e.: forms of
governments for instance) may be endogenous to the same type of socio-economic conﬂi c tt h a tc a u s e sc r i s i s
and determines stabilizations. This is a point raised in related literature by Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi
(2004), Trebbi, Aghion, and Alesina (2005) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004). This point also relates to the
"normative" question about institutional choice. We have argued above that certain types of institutions
may stabilize more promptly than others. But this does not mean that these institutions are "superior".
There can be (and in fact there probably is) a trade-oﬀ between promptness in stabilization eﬀorts and
other desirable features, like attention to inequality, control of executive power, checks and balances. From
a normative standpoint the choice of institutions requires a maximization over this trade-oﬀ.
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Table 1: Relative Frequency of Crises and Reforms  
 
 (1)  (3) 
  Deficit Crises  Inflation Crises 
    
Presidential systems  0.29  0.37 
Parliamentary systems  0.30  0.20 
Proportional systems  0.26  0.30 
Majoritarian systems  0.30  0.18 
Unified governments  0.28  0.32 
Divided governments  0.29  0.24 
Left governments  0.34  0.28 
Right + Center governments  0.26  0.30 
Legislative elections years  0.33  0.27 
No legislative elect. Years  0.29  0.29 
Executive elections years  0.28  0.36 
No executive elect. years  0.30  0.28 
Notes: Deficit Crises=country-years observations in which the deficit/GDP ratio is equal or above 4.75%. 4.75% is the value of the 
75th percentile of the deficit/GDP ratio empirical density. Inflation Crises=country-years observations in which inflation is equal 
or above 14.05%. 14.05% is the value of the 75th percentile of the inflation empirical density. Presidential/Parliamentary systems: 
indicator variable PRES=1/0. Proportional/Majoritarian systems: indicator variable PROP=1/0. Unified/Divided governments: 
indicator variable UNIFIED=1/0. Left/Right+Center governments: indicator variable LEFT=1/0. Legislative elections years/No 
legislative elect years: indicator variable LEGELEC=1/0. Executive elections years/No executive elect. years: indicator variable 
EXELEC= 1/0. See also Table A1 in the appendix. 
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Table 2: Politics, Deficit and Inflation Crises– average values 
    
 Crises  Crises 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Deficit/GDP  ΔDeficit/GDP Inflation  ΔInflation 
      
Presidential systems  6.63  -1.82  45.61  -7.06 
  (0.25) (0.24) (2.50) (1.67) 
Parliamentary systems  7.73  -0.69  38.29  -2.12 
  (0.21) (0.17) (3.01) (2.25) 
Proportional systems  8.04  -0.81  49.21  -7.43 
  (0.25) (0.20) (3.08) (1.99) 
Majoritarian systems  6.07  -1.30  27.86  -4.80 
  (0.25) (0.25) (2.87) (2.98) 
Unified governments  7.04  -1.40  40.24  -6.39 
  (0.25) (0.25) (2.57) (2.05) 
Divided governments  7.73  -0.78  47.92  -3.76 
  (0.23) (0.16) (3.59) (2.00) 
Left governments  8.02  -0.85  45.42  -3.28 
  (0.30) (0.24) (3.75) (2.83) 
Right + Center governments  7.56  -0.96  51.32  -4.77 
  (0.27) (0.22) (3.78) (2.10) 
Legislative elections years  7.62  -0.92  42.53  -3.42 
  (0.34) (0.29) (4.24) (2.81) 
No legislative elect. years  7.04  -1.36  43.41  -6.00 
  (0.18) (0.17) (2.20) (1.53) 
Executive elections years  8.22  -0.17  50.65  -3.59 
  (0.61) (0.61) (6.87) (3.01) 
No executive elect. years  7.08  -1.35  42.23  -5.70 
  (0.17) (0.15) (2.01) (1.47) 
Notes: Crises=country-years observations in which the deficit/GDP ratio (inflation rate) is equal or above 4.75% (14.05%). 4.75% 
(14.05%) is the value of the 75th percentile of the deficit/GDP ratio (inflation rate) empirical density. Presidential/Parliamentary 
systems: indicator variable PRES=1/0. Proportional/Majoritarian systems: indicator variable PROP=1/0. Unified/Divided 
governments: indicator variable UNIFIED=1/0. Left/Right+Center governments: indicator variable LEFT=1/0. Legislative 
elections years/No legislative elect years: indicator variable LEGELEC=1/0. Executive elections years/No executive elect. years: 
indicator variable EXELEC= 1/0. See also Table A1 in the appendix. Standard errors of the mean in parenthesis.  
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Table 3: Stabilizations, Crises and Form of Governments 
  
Panel A  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Δ(Deficit/GDP) 
1 year after crisis 
Δ(Deficit/GDP) 
2 years after crisis 
Δ(Deficit/GDP) 
3 year after crises 
Δ(Deficit/GDP) 
4 year after crisis 
        
CRISIS -0.015  -0.026  -0.032  -0.040 
 (-6.54)***  (-9.38)***  (-10.74)***  (-12.15)*** 
Crisis*PRES -0.019  -0.018  -0.018  -0.013 
 (-5.23)***  (-4.08)*** (-3.85)***  (-2.52)**
N. of observations  2323 2213 2103  1993
        
Panel B  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Δ(Inflation) 
1 year after crisis 
Δ(Inflation) 
2 years after crisis 
Δ(Inflation) 
3 year after crises 
Δ(Inflation) 
4 year after crisis 
        
CRISIS -0.037  -0.067  -0.086  -0.110 
 (-2.24)**  (-2.94)***  (-3.43)***  (-4.15)*** 
CRISIS*PRES -0.079  -0.114  -0.141  -0.137 
 (-3.11)***  (-3.30)*** (-3.59)***  (-3.40)***
N. of observations  2622 2503 2387  2273
Notes: In Panel A, Crises=country-years observations in which the deficit/GDP ratio is equal or above 4.75% (i.e. the value of the 
75th percentile of the deficit/GDP ratio empirical density). In Panel B, Crises=country-years observations in which inflation is 
equal or above 14.05% (i.e. the value of the 75th percentile of the inflation empirical density). PRES=1 if direct presidential; 0 if 
either the president is elected by the assembly or parliamentary. Country fixed effects and year dummies are always included in the 
estimation. T-statistics corrected for heterosckedasticity in parenthesis. *** (**) [*] = 1% (5%) [10%] significance level.  
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Table 4: Stabilizations, Crises and Constraints on the Executive 
  
Panel A  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Δ(Deficit/GDP) 
1 year after crisis 
Δ(Deficit/GDP) 
2 years after crisis 
Δ(Deficit/GDP) 
3 year after crises 
Δ(Deficit/GDP) 
4 year after crisis 
        
CRISIS -0.0413  -0.0463  -0.0548  -0.0568 
 (-8.78)***  (-8.40)***  (-8.76)***  (-8.89)*** 
EXECONST 0.0001  0.0013  0.0023  0.0032 
 (0.24)  (1.92)*  (3.11)***  (3.99)*** 
CRISIS*EXECONST 0.0039  0.0028  0.0030  0.0022 
 (5.01)***  (3.06)***  (2.86)***  (2.09)** 
N. of observations  2674  2546  2423  2301 
        
Panel B  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Δ(Inflation) 
1 year after crisis 
Δ(Inflation) 
2 years after crisis 
Δ(Inflation) 
3 year after crises 
Δ(Inflation) 
4 year after crisis 
        
CRISIS -0.1017  -0.1594  -0.1569  -0.1701 
 (-3.65)***  (-4.45)***  (-3.69)***  (-3.54)*** 
EXECONST 0.0018  0.0030  0.0057  0.0059 
 (0.62)  (0.72)  (1.06)  (0.91) 
CRISIS*EXECONST 0.0052  0.0089  0.0044  0.0033 
 (0.94)  (1.22)  (0.53)  (0.36) 
N. of observations  2949  2812  2680  2549 
Notes: In Panel A, Crises=country-years observations in which the deficit/GDP ratio is equal or above 4.75% (i.e. the value of the 
75th percentile of the deficit/GDP ratio empirical density). In Panel B, Crises=country-years observations in which inflation is 
equal or above 14.05% (i.e. the value of the 75th percentile of the inflation empirical density). EXECONST: institutional 
constraints on the executive; ∈ [1,7] and increasing in the number of executive constraints. Country fixed effects and year 
dummies are always included in the estimation. T-statistics corrected for heterosckedasticity in parenthesis. *** (**) [*] = 1% 
(5%) [10%] significance level.  
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Table 5: Stabilizations, Crises and Control of the Legislative Body  
  
Panel A  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Δ(Deficit/GDP) 
1 year after crisis 
Δ(Deficit/GDP) 
2 years after crisis 
Δ(Deficit/GDP) 
3 year after crises 
Δ(Deficit/GDP) 
4 year after crisis 
        
CRISIS -0.016  -0.029  -0.040  -0.047 
 (-6.85)***  (-9.24)***  (-10.95)***  (-11.52)*** 
UNIFIED -0.0001  -0.005  -0.011  -0.013 
 (-0.22)  (-1.99)**  (-3.49)***  (-3.81)*** 
CRISIS*UNIFIED -0.011  -0.006  0.003  0.005 
 (-3.25)*** (-1.39) (0.69)  (0.88)
N. of observations  2032 1909 1791  1677
        
Panel B  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Δ(Inflation) 
1 year after crisis 
Δ(Inflation) 
2 years after crisis 
Δ(Inflation) 
3 year after crises 
Δ(Inflation) 
4 year after crisis 
        
CRISIS -0.052  -0.094  -0.139  -0.180 
 (-2.87)***  (-3.78)***  (-4.83)***  (-5.87)*** 
UNIFIED -0.012  -0.021  -0.032  -0.043 
 (-1.12)  (-1.43)  (-1.70)*  (-1.97)** 
CRISIS*UNIFIED -0.050  -0.064  -0.064  -0.038 
 (-2.15)** (-1.95)* (-1.73)*  (-0.95)
N. of observations  2294 2164 2038  1919
Notes: In Panel A, Crises=country-years observations in which the deficit/GDP ratio is equal or above 4.75% (i.e. the value of the 
75th percentile of the deficit/GDP ratio empirical density). In Panel B, Crises=country-years observations in which inflation is 
equal or above 14.05% (i.e. the value of the 75th percentile of the inflation empirical density). UNIFIED=1 if the party of the 
executive controls the absolute majority of the legislative; 0 otherwise. Country fixed effects and year dummies are always 
included in the estimation. T-statistics corrected for heterosckedasticity in parenthesis. *** (**) [*] = 1% (5%) [10%] significance 
level.  
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Table 6: Stabilizations, Crises and Electoral Rules 
  
Panel A  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Δ(Deficit/GDP) 
1 year after crisis 
Δ(Deficit/GDP) 
2 years after crisis 
Δ(Deficit/GDP) 
3 year after crises 
Δ(Deficit/GDP) 
4 year after crisis 
        
CRISIS -0.023  -0.034  -0.031  -0.030 
 (-6.90)***  (-7.96)***  (-7.46)***  (-7.64)*** 
CRISIS*PROP 0.007  0.005  -0.006  -0.018 
 (1.60) (1.01) (-1.11)  (-3.10)***
N. of observations  1707 1600 1496  1394
        
Panel B  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Δ(Inflation) 
1 year after crisis 
Δ(Inflation) 
2 years after crisis 
Δ(Inflation) 
3 year after crises 
Δ(Inflation) 
4 year after crisis 
        
CRISIS -0.044  -0.093  -0.124  -0.119 
 (-1.75)*  (-4.62)***  (-6.18)***  (-6.09)*** 
CRISIS*PROP -0.066  -0.074  -0.091  -0.116 
 (-1.82)*  (-2.31)** (-2.65)***  (-3.30)***
N. of observations  1958 1840 1725  1615
Notes: In Panel A, Crises=country-years observations in which the deficit/GDP ratio is equal or above 4.75% (i.e. the value of the 
75th percentile of the deficit/GDP ratio empirical density). In Panel B, Crises=country-years observations in which inflation is 
equal or above 14.05% (i.e. the value of the 75th percentile of the inflation empirical density). PROP=1 if the electoral rule for the 
Lower House is a form of proportional representation; 0 otherwise. Country fixed effects and year dummies are always included in 
the estimation. T-statistics corrected for heterosckedasticity in parenthesis. *** (**) [*] = 1% (5%) [10%] significance level.  
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Table 7: Stabilizations, Crises and Political Business Cycles 
    
Panel  A  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Δ(Deficit/GDP) 
1 year after 
crisis 
Δ(Deficit/GDP)
1 year after 
crisis 
Δ(Deficit/GDP)
1 year after 
crisis 
Δ(Deficit/GDP)
1 year after 
crisis 
Δ(Deficit/GDP)
1 year after 
crisis 
Δ(Deficit/GDP)
1 year after 
crisis 
        
POL  -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.002  0.003  0.001 
 (-3.22)***  (-3.16)***  (-1.99)**  (1.26)  (1.77)*  (0.92) 
CRISIS    -0.020 -0.016   -0.026 -0.026 
    (-8.92)*** (-5.25)***   (-12.27)***  (-11.47)*** 
CRISIS*POL    -0.002    0.004 
    (-1.49)    (1.03) 
N.  of  observations  1898 1898 1898 2331 2331 2331 
        
Panel  B  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Δ Inflation 
1 year after 
crisis 
Δ Inflation 
1 year after 
crisis 
Δ Inflation 
1 year after 
crisis 
Δ Inflation 
1 year after 
crisis 
Δ Inflation 
1 year after 
crisis 
Δ Inflation 
1 year after 
crisis 
        
POL  0.001 0.0001  0.003 0.005 0.005 -0.002 
  (0.18)  (0.001) (1.87)* (0.51)  (0.51)  (-0.53) 
CRISIS    -0.088 -0.070   -0.087 -0.092 
    (-6.42)*** (-3.27)***   (-7.35)*** (-6.51)*** 
CRISIS*POL    -0.009    0.024 
    (-0.94)    (0.77) 
N.  of  observations  2168 2168 2168 2627 2627 2627 
Notes: In Panel A, Crises=country-years observations in which the deficit/GDP ratio is equal or above 4.75% (i.e. the value of the 
75th percentile of the deficit/GDP ratio empirical density). In Panel B, Crises=country-years observations in which inflation is 
equal or above 14.05% (i.e. the value of the 75th percentile of the inflation empirical density). Pol = YRCURNT in columns 1-3. 
Pol = LEGELEC in columns 4 – 6. YRCURNT = number of years left in the current term. LEGELEC=1 if in a given year 
legislative elections are held; 0 otherwise. Country fixed effects and year dummies are always included in the estimation. T-
statistics corrected for heterosckedasticity in parenthesis. *** (**) [*] = 1% (5%) [10%] significance level.  
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Table 8: Stabilizations, Crises and Governments’ Political Orientation 
  
Panel A  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Δ(Deficit/GDP) 
1 year after crisis 
Δ(Deficit/GDP) 
2 years after crisis 
Δ(Deficit/GDP) 
3 year after crises 
Δ(Deficit/GDP) 
4 year after crisis 
        
CRISIS -0.020  -0.028  -0.037  -0.042 
 (-6.91)***  (-7.65)***  (-9.15)***  (-10.15)*** 
LEFT -0.001  -0.005  -0.008  -0.011 
 (-0.35)  (-1.78)*  (-2.21)**  (-2.60)*** 
CRISIS*LEFT -0.0001  -0.0001  0.0001  -0.002 
 (-0.08)  (-0.01) (0.04)  (-0.38)
N. of observations  1509 1401 1301  1208
        
Panel B  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Δ(Inflation) 
1 year after crisis 
Δ(Inflation) 
2 years after crisis 
Δ(Inflation) 
3 year after crises 
Δ(Inflation) 
4 year after crisis 
        
CRISIS -0.081  -0.159  -0.216  -0.230 
 (-3.24)***  (-4.51)***  (-5.61)***  (-5.60)*** 
LEFT -0.001  -0.004  -0.019  -0.027 
 (-0.12)  (-0.23)  (-1.01)  (-1.10) 
CRISIS*LEFT 0.005  0.045  0.051  0.008 
 (0.10)  (0.68) (0.73)  (0.11)
N. of observations  1686 1571 1464  1365
Notes: In Panel A, Crises=country-years observations in which the deficit/GDP ratio is equal or above 4.75% (i.e. the value of the 
75th percentile of the deficit/GDP ratio empirical density). In Panel B, Crises=country-years observations in which inflation is 
equal or above 14.05% (i.e. the value of the 75th percentile of the inflation empirical density). LEFT=1 if the executive belongs to 
a party of the left; 0 if right-wing or centrist. Country fixed effects and year dummies are always included in the estimation. T-
statistics corrected for heterosckedasticity in parenthesis. *** (**) [*] = 1% (5%) [10%] significance level.  
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Table 9: Stabilizations, Crises and IMF Programs 
  
Panel A  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Δ(Deficit/GDP) 
1 year after crisis 
Δ(Deficit/GDP) 
2 years after crisis 
Δ(Deficit/GDP) 
3 year after crises 
Δ(Deficit/GDP) 
4 year after crisis 
        
CRISIS -0.023  -0.033  -0.039  -0.043 
 (-11.85)***  (-14.18)***  (-15.40)***  (-16.11)*** 
IMFPROGR -0.0001  -0.001  0.003  0.009 
 (-0.02)  (-0.31)  (0.66)  (2.02)** 
CRISIS*IMFPROGR -0.006  -0.002  -0.008  -0.020 
 (-1.49)  (-0.41)  (-1.20)  (-2.41)** 
N. of observations  3192  3076  2963  2852 
        
Panel B  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Δ(Inflation) 
1 year after crisis 
Δ(Inflation) 
2 years after crisis 
Δ(Inflation) 
3 year after crises 
Δ(Inflation) 
4 year after crisis 
        
CRISIS -0.067  -0.099  -0.110  -0.129 
 (-5.18)***  (-5.42)***  (-4.99)***  (-5.09)*** 
IMFPROGR 0.013  0.021  0.030  0.027 
 (1.14)  (1.03)  (1.18)  (0.94) 
CRISIS*IMFPROGR -0.052  -0.130  -0.211  -0.201 
 (-1.54)  (-2.32)**  (-2.97)***  (-2.50)** 
N. of observations  3562  3442  3325  3210 
Notes: In Panel A, Crises=country-years observations in which the deficit/GDP ratio is equal or above 4.75% (the value of the 75th 
percentile of the deficit/GDP ratio empirical density). In Panel B, Crises=country-years observations in which inflation is equal or 
above 14.05% (the value of the 75th percentile of the inflation empirical density). Country fixed effects and year dummies are 
always included in the estimation. T-statistics corrected for heterosckedasticity in parenthesis. *** (**) [*] significant at the 1% 
(5%) [10%] level. Variable Definition Source
Variable name in source 
database
EXECONST
Number of executive 
constraints; ranges from 1 (min 
constraint) to 7 (max 
constraint).
Polity IV, 2005 XCONST
EXELEC
1 if in a given year executive 
elections are held.
Database of Political 
Institutions 2004. World Bank
EXELEC
LEFT
1 if the executive belongs to a 
party of the left and 0 if right-
wing or centrist.
Database of Political 
Institutions 2004. World Bank
EXECRLC
LEGELEC
1 if in a given year legislative 
elections are held.
Database of Political 
Institutions 2004. World Bank
LEGELEC
PRES
1 if direct presidential, 0 if 
either the president is elected by 
the assembly or parliamentary 
system. 
Database of Political 
Institutions 2004. World Bank
SYSTEM
PROP
1 if the electoral rule for the 
Lower House is a form of 
proportional representation and 
0 otherwise.
Database of Political 
Institutions 2004. World Bank
PR
UNIFIED
1 if the party of the executive 
controls the absolute majority 
of the legislative; 0 otherwise.
Database of Political 
Institutions 2004. World Bank
ALLHOUSE
YRCURNT
Number of years left in the 
current term for the executive.
Database of Political 
Institutions 2004. World Bank
YRCURNT
Table A1: Political variables definition
 31